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The relationship between justice and freedom has remained inadequately explored in the 
literature on Durkheim.  The existing literature has either discussed Durkheim’s concept 
of justice in the narrow contexts of the division of labor, relation to human talents, and 
relation to Durkheim’s Jewish background. In this paper, Durkheim’s concept of justice 
is reexamined in terms of its relation to his concepts of freedom.  It is argued that for 
Durkheim justice is the condition of possibility of freedom under advanced division of 
labor.  The state plays an instrumental role in this relationship by allocating rights and 
powers to individuals and by protecting equitable social relations through regulation.   
 
Introduction  
Over the years, scholars have persistently focused on Durkheim’s thoughts on the methods of 
social sciences, the division of labor, religion, suicide and crime.  Durkheim’s concept of justice, 
however, has not attracted much attention.  Furthermore, the few that have studied the subject 
matter have discussed it in the narrow contexts of the division of labor (e.g., Sirianni 1984), its 
relation to human talents (Green 1989), and its relation to Durkheim’s Jewish background 
(Schoenfeld and Mestrovic 1989).  Moreover, they all have failed to systematically discuss the 
concept in relation to another concept that is of utmost significance in Durkheim’s thought: 
freedom.  This paper aims to address these shortcomings.  It argues that for Durkheim justice is 
the condition of possibility of freedom under advanced division of labor.  The state plays an 
instrumental role in this relationship by allocating rights and powers to individuals and by 
protecting equitable social relations through regulation.     
 
Functions of Morality 
 
In its most developed form in the work of Durkheim, morality appears as: (1) regulation 
expressed in imperative law, which demands complete obedience from individuals (obligatory); 
and (2) a social ideal to which individuals aspire (the ‘good’)  
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Duty is morality insofar as it commands.  It is morality conceived as an authority 
that we must obey because, and only because, it is authority.  The good is 
morality conceived as a desirable thing that attracts our wills to it spontaneously, 
quickening our desire for it. (1961: 96)1 
 
As regulation, morality restrains human forces that if left unto themselves “tend to grow beyond 
all bounds” (1997b: xxxii).  The philosophical basis for this is that, along with all other forms of 
existence, human activity too is by necessity subject to restraint by other beings (1997a: 252).  As 
regulation, morality is the condition of possibility of social life because it restrains human’s 
pursuit of selfish interests (egoism).  Moral restriction of human activities takes place through 
rules (legal or customary) which force “the individual to act in accordance with ends that are not 
for his own, to make concessions, to agree to compromise, to take into account interests superior 
to his own” (1997b: 172-73).  The function of morality, in other words, is to create altruism by 
making human beings to follow impersonal ends.  Altruism, in turn, makes a harmonious 
community of endeavors for the collective interest possible.  Durkheim believes that no human 
group will be able to persist without moral discipline.   
As the ‘good,’ morality is the regulator of humans’ range of desires and wants, which are 
not by nature predisposed to restraint and “No living being can be happy or even exist unless his 
needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means” (1997a: 246).  In animals this equilibrium is 
established through instinct because they depend only on material conditions.  Animals’ faculty 
of reflection is not sufficiently developed to imagine any other wants other than the physical ones.  
This is not, however, the case with human beings because most of their needs are either not 
dependent on their bodies or not to the same degree: “Beyond the indispensable minimum, which 
satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions” (1997a: 
247).  When desires are not controlled they can only be a source of anguish because they are 
insatiable by definition.  The collective consciousness plays this role by assigning an upper limit 
to which people can legitimately aspire to.  This regulation, however, must be recognized as just 
by individuals otherwise they will not consent to restrict their desires.  Therefore, they “must 
receive it from an authority which they respect, to which they yield spontaneously” (1997a: 249).  
This authority is society’s stock of fundamental moral values  
 
…society…is above all a composition of ideas…Foremost of these ideas is the 
moral ideal which is its principal raison d’etre.  To love one’s society is to love 
this ideal, and one loves it so that one would rather see society disappear as a 
material entity than renounce the idea which it embodies.  (1974: 59) 
 
At the center of these values is   
 
…the ideal man as the society conceives him, and each society conceives its 
ideal in its own image…The ideal type which each society demands that it 
members realize is the keystone of the whole social system and gives it its unity. 
(1974: 56-57) 
 
Evolutionary Nature of Morality 
 
Morality evolves based on the law of division of labor.  This law applies to “organisms as well as 
societies” and its origin goes back “into an infinitely distant past…almost contemporaneous with 
the coming of life upon earth” (1997b: 3).  This evolution consists of a gradual separation and 
specialization of various functions which are originally indistinct.  It is a spontaneous, 
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unconscious movement driven by a “need for distinction and separation” (1983: 95) inherent in 
reality itself.  In human societies, the original state takes the form of mechanical solidarity, i.e., 
“an absolutely homogenous mass whose parts would not be distinguishable from one another” 
(1997b: 126).  Here a strong, well-defined collective consciousness imposes itself on everyone 
and punishes non-altruistic acts.  The latter are considered threats (crimes) against the unity of the 
collective and are identified by inhibitive laws.  Elements of the collective consciousness are 
usually crystallized in religious symbols that attract and awe the individual.  At this stage, given 
the primitive nature of life, the range of human desires is limited (mostly to desires for necessities 
of life).  Furthermore, individuals’ actions are reflexive and habitual rather than reflective and 
self-determined and they themselves possess little or no worth in comparison to the collective.   
Demographic changes eventually disturb the original state.  These changes, if they bring 
about closer interaction between people and not dispersal, will result in a Darwinian struggle over 
scarce resources.  This struggle, however, is a functional struggle.  This means that in the same 
location different occupations can coexist without being forced to compete because they pursue 
different objectives.  However, occupations that perform the same functions are forced into 
competition over limited resources.  An increasing division of labor functions to prevent such a 
situation and “to create between two or more people a feeling of solidarity” (1997b: 17) by 
forcing various individuals to concentrate only on one part of the total function (specialization).  
This makes individuals dependent, rather than competing, with each other.  Now, they can coexist 
and cooperate in relative harmony (equilibrium).  Harmony here is relative because it arises only 
of moderation of conflicts and not their complete elimination.  This is because it is based only on 
limiting egoism not eliminating it.  For Durkheim, ‘equilibrium’ (order, stability) is a middle 
course between total conflict and total harmony of interests and reflects conditions of existence.  
It is, put differently, a state of compromise which is regulated and stabilized through laws and 
customs and is reached only through a long process of trail and error of trying to adjust to 
conditions of existence.  The end result is ‘organic solidarity.’ However, equilibrium can also be 
reached through means other than specialization (e.g., immigration, colonization of other places, 
acceptance of defeat, suicide).   
Civil laws increase rapidly in number as the division of labor increases.  They function to 
regulate functional interconnections by restoring the status quo when they are disturbed.  Under 
increasing division of labor beliefs and sentiments that are specific to certain sectors of society 
(‘professional moralities’) grow in number and result in a decentralization of moral life.  These 
professional sentiments are moral because they “force the individual to act in accordance with 
ends that are not for his own…to agree to compromise, to take into account interests superior to 
his own” (1997b: 172-73).  Under these conditions the stock of beliefs and sentiments that 
transcend professional barriers decreases and becomes less commonly known.  Civil laws make 
up for the decreasing share of direct individuals’ knowledge of the collective interests, which tend 
to become increasingly abstract and remote.  Under contemporary levels of division of labor a 
state of affairs is finally reached where the only sentiment capable of transcending sectoral beliefs 
and presenting itself as the collective interest is the idea of moral individualism (or idea of 
‘humanity’).  Moral individualism means having “sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for 
all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater 
thirst for justice” (1975: 64).  Moral individualism is now the ultimate object of moral action and, 
contrary to the nature of moral ideals of characteristic of mechanical solidarities, is not totally 
unconnected with the individual’s interests.   
Durkheim's evolutionary view of morality results in his moral relativism: a society in its 
various stages of evolution possesses different, and increasingly multiple, forms of morality, all 
of which are natural and just.  This is why he dismisses all claims to philosophical-ethical 
absolution as certain historically-specific principles raised to the level of universality (1974: 80-1; 
1979: 30-1; 1997b: 5-6).  He believes that it is only by adopting a value judgment that one can 
rank different moralities which, from a factual standpoint, are only a collection of imperatives and 
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ideas.  Durkheim, for his part, believes in the superiority of the contemporary moral 
individualism over the morality of past societies.   
 
Why ‘Moral Individualism’ Is Moral? 
 
Durkheim distinguishes his own conception of individualism from that of eighteenth century 
liberalism, epitomized by Kant and Rousseau, which “the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
sought…to translate into formulae, that which is taught in our schools and which has become the 
basis of our moral catechism” (1975: 61).  According to the liberal view, Durkheim argues, acts 
that are based on personal motives are immoral and those that only have impersonal ends in view 
moral.  The problem with this view, he argues, is that the individuals are held in such a high 
steam that their interests and rights become irreconcilable with that of the common good.  Kant, 
for example, argues that a rational, abstract faculty (pure, practical reason), which is inherent in 
all human beings, can point to the common interest.  Kant, therefore, Durkheim continues, raises 
the individual to the level of a sacred being that “has something of that transcendental majesty 
which the churches of all times have given to their Gods” (1975: 62).  Although for Rousseau, 
according to Durkheim, it is the impersonal ‘general will’ that constitutes the end of moral action, 
he views, nevertheless, individual “as a sort of absolute who can and must be sufficient unto 
himself” (1975: 63).  He therefore deifies acts of egoism.  Both Kant and Rousseau’s brands of 
‘individualism’ are, therefore, anti-social in nature because they grant the individual more respect 
than the collective and let the individual’s interests override that of the collective’s.  This is why 
Kant and Rousseau have difficulties reconciling the two in their works and cannot account for the 
establishment of society.  Durkheim writes that, in general, this was also the reason behind 
eighteenth-century liberal thought’s obsession with political freedom and free development of 
individual: it always saw a contradiction between “Liberty and authority” (1956:89).  Since the 
state was the only possible source of authority, it became one of the main focuses of liberal 
thought.  Liberal’s attitude towards it, however, was ambivalent.  On the one hand, it was a 
potential threat to individuals’ liberties; on the other, it was needed to protect these very liberties.  
A compromise was reached: the state’s authority, which was conceived to be an artificial 
apparatus, was justifiable only to the extent that it meted out “negative justice,” i.e., protection of 
individuals’ natural rights (1996:52).   
Durkheim argues that the Kant and Rousseau’s mistake is that they do not realize that if 
the individual is held in such high esteem, it is not because he is inherently respect-worthy or 
possesses rights, but because the society has bestowed these on him.  He writes that individuals 
must be made knowledgeable of the true source of their dignity (i.e. society) through education 
and, thereby, made to love it and sacrifice their interests for it.  This, however, requires a lengthy 
process of education from childhood.  But since the eighteenth-century view of individual “has 
penetrated our institutions and our customs,” first a transformation of existing educational system 
to one that teaches that “It is humanity that is sacred and worthy of respect” is required (1975: 
62).   
Durkheim also distinguishes his moral individualism from that of Spencer and the 
classical economists.  To him, these are only different forms glorification of individuals’ egoistic, 
utilitarian aims and a “narrow commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast 
apparatus of production and exchange” (1975: 60).  True individualism, for Durkheim, consists in 
glorification of the individual’s universal, altruistic interests. He blames the shortcomings of 
views such as those of Kant, Rousseau and Spencer on their misplaced individualism.  By this he 
means four different forms of explanations: (1) science of individual psychology; (2) explanations 
in terms of organic factors; (3) explanation in terms of the individual’s intentions or particular 
circumstances; and (4) explanations in terms of individuals’ mental states or dispositions (Lukes 
1982:7).  He also refers to (3) and (4) as “abstract” individualism, under which he includes: (a) 
natural law theory, according to which social order arises out of innate moral rules; (b) the 
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Hobbesian school, which sees the origin of social life in institutional sanctions; and (c) 
Manchester economists, who argue for spontaneous engendering of social order (Wallwork 
1972:35).  Durkheim argues that abstract individualism contains a “double error” (Durkheim 
1973:37-9).  The first error is that it starts with the flawed assumption of an absolutely 
autonomous, ahistorical individual as the starting point of theoretical deliberations.  This 
assumption, in turn, has immense consequences for the abstract-individualism’s solution to the 
“gravest” dilemma of social theory: whether to “subordinate society to individual or the 
individual to society” (Durkheim 1978:112).  The first solution is that it subordinates individual 
to society—e.g., Hobbes—and, thereby, denies any moral worth to the individual.  The second 
solution is that it subordinates society to individual (e.g., Spencer) and, thereby, denies society 
any reality of its own.  In both cases, however, a methodological mistake is made: the complex 
(society) is explained by the simple (the individual).   
The second solution is Durkheim’s main target.  This solution is usually followed by a 
utilitarian ethics, a laissez-faire economics, and a rigid political individualism (Alpert 1961:138).  
His main opponent here is utilitarianism and Spencer.  He rejects the utilitarian argument that 
pursuit of self-interest will result in social order.  He finds a number of problem with the 
utilitarian scheme: (1) it assumes that interests are given; (2) it cannot account for the 
reconciliation various interests of the individual; (3) it cannot account for the problem of 
rationality, i.e., how the relation between interests and means of achieving them are to be 
conceived; and (4) it cannot satisfactorily explain the problem of order, i.e., ‘how can social 
stability emerge out of pursuit of interest?’ (Parsons 1974:xlvi-xlvii).  The last one of these is the 
crucial one.  Spencer, in line with the economic branch of utilitarian tradition, introduced 
individually-chosen contracts as the key to the problem.  Durkheim rejects this view.  He argues 
that contractual agreements are made possible only through certain non-contractual elements that 
provide individuals with “the definitions of the interests for which contracts may be entered 
into…the means by which such interests may legitimately be pursued…and the bearing on 
contracts of interests other than those of the contracting parties…” (Parsons 1974:li).  These non-
contractual elements are legal rules that reflect dominant social views of the ‘good society,’ 
‘justice,’ or what can in general be called ‘social ends.’  In other words, collective conscience 
identifies the form that the relationships between individuals have to take.2  In making this point, 
however, Durkheim talks his way around a legitimate claim of the methodological individualism: 
logic and science can deal only with empirical facts (in this case, individuals’ behavior and 
interests) and not ‘social ends’ which are in reality subjective value judgments about future events 
(Merton 1990:22).  He would not have this because it would have resulted in a conception of 
society that resembled Hobbes’ ‘anomic’ state of nature (where interest reigns) and would have 
robbed it of, in the words of Alpert (1961:176), any capacity for “integral activity.”   
Durkheim argues that one of the major mistakes of abstract individualism’s is its 
interpretation of freedom: it mistakenly believes that release from direct forms of social control, 
characteristic of mechanical solidarities where the collective conscience’s authority denies any 
freedom to the individual, means absolute release from any form of collective control (absolute 
freedom) (Parsons, 1960: 146-147).  He believes that collective life under organic solidarities 
does not dispense with the collective control of individuals but only requires new forms of it 
which are compatible with the individuals’ newly found freedoms.  Here, collective control 
essentially takes the form of collective values and discourses that render the acceptance of such 
freedoms a responsibility on the part of individuals (Parsons, 1960: 146-147).  An example of 
                                                 
2
  Durkheim distinguished between five different sets of collective consciences that were to govern 
individuals’ actions and reconcile their diverse interests under the modern conditions of complex division 
of labor: “the morale individuelle, the morale domestique, the morale professionnelle, the morale civique, 
and a fifth set for which he has no title but which governs the relations of men to one another precisely as 
men” (Steeman 1990:70).     
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this, provided in Suicide, is Protestants’ obligation to the collective beliefs of Protestantism not to 
obey direct control of any church and, in stark contrast to the Catholic, to preserve their direct 
relationship to God if they want to remain good Protestants.  Nevertheless, as a result of their first 
error both solutions, and this constitutes the second error of abstract individualism, picture human 
beings’ as inherently anti-social, egoistic beings that constantly run into an unnatural, forced, or 




It was mentioned earlier that, for Durkheim, morality appears as (1) regulation expressed in 
imperative law, which demands complete obedience of individuals (obligatory); and (2) a social 
ideal to which individuals aspire (the ‘good’).  It was also mentioned that the latter consists of a 
society’s vision of ideal human being.  Now, adjustment of rules to this ideal so to bring them to 
reflect it, is what constitutes justice of him.  This usually takes place automatically under 
‘spontaneous’ division of labor.  Spontaneous here means when the course of the evolution of the 
division of labor is not externally controlled as in class and caste societies.  Therefore, justice    
 
…is the necessary accompaniment to every kind of solidarity.  It is necessarily 
encountered everywhere men live a life in common, whether this results from the 
social division of labour or from the attraction of like for like. (1997b: 77) 
 
This is why for Durkheim any society, through the course of its development, contains some form 
of justice.  Where the spontaneous development of the division of labor is hampered, injustice 
will follow.  A major instance of this is the contemporary class- or caste-controlled division of 
labor (“forced” division of labor).  Here rules and laws reflect class and caste interest and not that 
of the individual as such   
 
…it is not enough for rules to exist, for occasionally it is these very rules that are 
the cause of evil.  This is what happens in the class war.  The institution of 
classes or castes constitutes one organization of the division of labor, one that is 
closely regulated.  Yet it is often a source of dissension. (1997b: 310) 
 
Here is where injustice takes place: “constraint begins only when regulation, no longer 
corresponding to the true state of affairs and consequently without any moral foundation, is only 
maintained by force” (1997b:312).  Unjust rules are causes of immense suffering.  Since people 
now deeply believe in the promises of moral individualism they are less likely to be content with 
their lot in life.  Conflict and strife, therefore, becomes rampant.  In general Durkheim views the 
rise of various social movements of the nineteenth century as reactions not to the division of labor 
as such—after all, how can one challenge a law of life?—but the abnormal forms it has taken.  He 
therefore argues in favor of a situation that is in accord with the ideal of ‘humanity’ and, 
therefore, agreeable to all and no longer based on the ideals of bygone eras (1975: 66; 1997b: 
310).  The ideal of moral individualism, for him, is the only legitimate source upon which modern 
rules can be based because it is product of historical evolution itself.  Any other criterion would 
be either utopian, i.e., not a product of historical evolution of society, and, therefore, impractical 
if not outright dangerous to social order.  Adjustment of rules to the ideal of moral individualism 
results in justice in that in results in injecting “an even greater equity into our social relationships” 
(1997b:321).   
For Durkheim inequity means two things: (1) misallocation of individuals to social roles, 
and (2) lack of equivalence in the exchange of goods and services. (Lukes 1972: 175).  The first 
one can be remedied by equalizing the external conditions of competition: “If nothing hampers or 
favours unduly rivals most fitted for each type of activity will succeed in obtaining it” (1997b: 
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312).  This will ensure free deployment of individuals’ talents and abilities in their own chosen 
function in a broad, stable, and spontaneous network of functional relationship.  This also means 
that everyone is “rewarded according to his deserts” (1997b:339).  This is exactly what class and 
caste societies prevent.  One of the ways in which class-based societies do this is by maintaining 
the institution of inheritance.  Durkheim’s conception, however, has its difficulties  
 
How are ‘individual aptitudes’ to be identified, how can ‘natural’ talents be 
distinguished from their socialized forms?…How…could ‘social inequalities’ 
express ‘natural inequalities’?” (Luke 1972: 177)    
 
Equality of opportunity, nevertheless, Durkheim concedes, will most likely results in unequal 
outcomes.  These outcomes, however, according to him, will be accepted as just because its 
ultimate source (i.e., moral individualism) is perceived to be legitimate.  The second form of 
inequality can be prevented by ensuring that contracts are just, i.e., external conditions under 
which contracts are agreed upon are equalized so that the price of objects or services is equivalent 
to the labor that they embody.  Removal of these two main forms of inequality will result in 
structurally integrated and normatively legitimate form of social life.  But how can we be certain 
that a state, although it may represent itself as a state of happiness and calm, is really an objective 
state of equilibrium and not the subjective preferences of the observer?  Durkheim introduces 
crime and suicide rates as the objective yardsticks for recognizing a true state of equilibrium: 
“The average number of suicide or crimes of every description may serve to indicate the level of 
immorality in any given society” (1997b: 12). 
Durkheim believes that the highest form of justice is charity.  Charity is the deepening of 
feeling of human fraternity: “It ignores and denies any special merit in gifts or mental capacity 
acquired by heredity.  This, then, is the very acme of justice” (1996: 220).  Charity for Durkheim 
is qualitatively different from justice in its more popular form of respect for the individual.  
Charitable people, though they care about justice for others, do not care about whether justice has 
been done to them in one respect: “the best amongst men are capable of working without getting 
an exact recompense for their pains and their services” (1996: 220).  However, he believes that 
such achievement is rare 
 
We have not yet reached the day when man can love all his fellow-creatures as 
brothers, whatever their faculties, their intellect or moral values.  Nor has man 
reached the stage when he has shed his egotism so successfully that it is no 
longer necessary to put a tentative price on merit…with the purpose of 
stimulating it (the merit) and of keeping the price steady.  This is what makes a 
complete leveling to equal values impossible today. (1996: 220)    
 
Durkheim’s passion for justice, however, is exclusive of women. Women are largely 
absent in his work, and when they do appear briefly, they are “consigned to the exterior of 
society, to the nonsocial sphere of biological reproduction” (Lehmann 1994:4; also see Lamanna 
2002:178).  His comments on women are usually derogatory.  In Suicide, for example, he writes 
of women that “Fundamentally traditionalist by nature, they govern their conduct by fixed beliefs 
and have no great intellectual needs” (Durkheim 1997b:166).  When it comes to women he even 
neglects his own principles of education.  Instead of outlining the importance of women’s 
education for increasing moral authority of society, he takes the opposite line and rejects such 
measures (Gane 1995:233).  Another neglected group of individuals in the work of Durkheim are 
immigrants.  By the close of the century France had about one million or more immigrant 
workers who were not only the constant target of violent acts of the French workers, but also a 
convenient excuse for the latter’s mobilization for strikes and demonstrations by various parties 
(Noiriel 1996:152; Jones 1999:11).  However, since in those days immigration was not 
considered to be a legitimate subject for France’s national memory, a whole segment of France’s 
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collective history and identity was relegated to the realm of private memories (Noiriel 1996:106).  
In line with the spirit of his time, Durkheim (1961:280) only in passing suggests a need for an 
“economic cosmopolitanism” that is to be “less personal in its temper, less exclusive, more 
receptive to people and things from abroad.”  For the rest, the immigrants’ plight is explainable in 
terms of certain temporary anomalies associated with the division of labor; in time their working 
condition will be regulated and they themselves will be absorbed in France’s cultural life.  In 
general, this is also Durkheim’s view of various socialist movements which to him, despite 
socialists’ claims to scientific origins and aims, are only expressions of the “collective malaise” 
[Italic original] (Durkheim 1958:7).  To Durkheim these are no serious obstacles in the way of 
realization of the meritocratic ideal of the Republic (Pickering and Walford 1998:8). 
 
Justice and the State 
 
Durkheim argues in favor of a commitment by Western countries to address the injustices of their 
societies     
  
The task of the most advanced societies may therefore be said to be a mission for 
justice.  That in fact they feel the need to tread this path we have already 
demonstrated, and this is proved also by everyday experience.  Just as the ideal of 
lower societies was to create or maintain a common life as intense as possible, in 
which the individual was engulfed, ours is to inject an even greater equity into our 
social relationships...  (1997b: 321; also see 1961: 77) 
 
The state can serve the cause of justice by expanding human rights through legislation.   
Durkheim pits this conception against the natural rights doctrine according to which humans’ 
rights are inherent in their nature and definable once and for all: “man is man only because he 
lives in society.  Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal 
on a par with other animals” (1996: 60).  Another way in which the state can serve justice is by 
protecting individuals from the oppressive influences of various social spheres, particularly the 
economic sphere.  In order to prevent the state itself from becoming one such nefarious sphere, 
Durkheim suggests that it should be checked by the forces of secondary professional groups (civil 
society).  He is, however, skeptical of the ability of nation-states to rise above their national 
egoisms and act for the greater good of an international entity that, though prefigured by the very 




Justice based on moral individualism, characteristic of contemporary society, is different from 
justice under mechanical solidarity in that the former has the individual as its end     
 
…the characteristic of morality in organized societies, as compared to segmentary 
societies, is that it possesses something more human, and consequently more 
rational, about it.  It does not cause our activity to depend upon ends that do not 
directly concern us.  It does not make us the servants of some ideal powers 
completely different in nature from ourselves, powers who follow their own course 
without heeding the interests of men.  It requires us only to be charitable and just 
towards our fellow-men, to fulfill our task well, to work towards a state where 
everyone is called to fulfill the function he performs best and will received a just 
reward for his efforts.  (1997a:338) 
 
In order to understand this difference we have to understand Durkheim’s concepts of nature and 
freedom. 
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“Man depends,” Durkheim writes, “upon…three kinds of environment: the organism,3 
the external world and society” (1997b: 287-88; also see 1995: 431).  The totality of these 
environments constitutes nature 
 
By natural order we understand only what might occur in what has been termed the 
state of nature, that is, under the sole influence of physical and organico-physical 
causes. (Durkheim 1997b: 322; also see 1975: 78) 
  
Nature operates according to natural laws that are subject to the law of causality.  Natural laws 
refer to the necessary relations between phenomena which can be expressed in scientific 
propositions (1974: 80).  Natural phenomena operate in total disregard of human will and control.  
As such, they tend to dominate humans and, therefore, constitute a realm of bondage for them.  
Understanding the natural order renders it amenable to human control and regulation.  This means 
stripping nature of its “fortuitous, absurd and amoral character” (Durkheim 1997b: 321).  
Freedom, therefore, begins with the knowledge of, and intervention in, the natural order.  Such 
knowledge is gained only through science: a rational system of clear and distinct ideas about 
phenomena.  Liberation from natural bonds, therefore, is realized only through science of natural 
laws; there is no other means of liberation (Durkheim 1961: 116; 1974: 35; 1996: 91; 1997b: 
xxiii).   
According to Durkheim, the natural law of social relations is inequality:  human beings 
are unequal in the external conditions of their existence and in their individual abilities (1979: 2; 
1997b: 321).  Natural inequalities, which “are the very negation of liberty” (1997b: 321), can be 
greatly reduced through social regulation.  This means subordination of these naturally-given 
inequalities to socially-produced equalities, “an utter reversal of the natural order” (Durkheim 
1997b: 321).  This reversal results in a moral order.  The more complete this control is, the 
greater become the chances of reducing inequalities of opportunities in the struggle for existence 
and, therefore, the greater the degree of social justice.  Modern form of justice and freedom, 
therefore, depends on scientific knowledge.  Durkheim argues, furthermore, that modern 
individuals prefer freedom to bondage to nature because they are capable of “value judgments” 
(“moral ideal,” “moral judgments”).  Value judgments refer to       
 
…all judgments, be they individual or collective, which men pass with respect to 
their own actions or the actions of others, so as to single them out by ascribing a 
special value to them, which is regarded as quite separate and distinct from all other 
human values…moral judgments occupy a special place within the totality of human 
judgments… (Durkheim 1974: 79) 
 
Freedom, therefore, is nothing but individuals’ act of imputing to certain state of affairs a worth 
and desirability which they lack in their factual existences.  The desire and freedom to intervene 
in the social order are needed if the social order is to be made more equitable (Durkheim 1956: 
90; 1958: 52; 1961: 54; 1997b: 320, 321).  This equity, in turn, results in individual autonomy in 
the concrete sense of having the opportunity to consciously choose one’s goals in life.   
 
                                                 
3  The organic constitution of human beings, i.e., the body and its bio-chemical reactions, the 
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